IN WHOM WE TRUST: GROUP MEMBERSHIP AS AN AFFECTIVE CONTEXT FOR TRUST DEVELOPMENT

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Examining the ways in which affect impacts the trust that develops between members of dissimilar groups broadens the study of trust development. People's perceptions of their own interdependence with other groups influence both their beliefs about group members' trustworthiness and their affect for group members. I propose that this affect, in turn, influences interpersonal trust development through multiple paths: cognitive, motivational, and behavioral. Using literature on social information processing, emotion, and intergroup behavior, I elucidate the social and affective context of trust development.

Interpersonal trust is an important social resource that can facilitate cooperation and enable coordinated social interactions (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1988; Zucker, 1986). It reduces the need to monitor others' behavior, formalize procedures, and create completely specified contracts (Macauley, 1963; Powell, 1990). Because trust facilitates informal cooperation and reduces negotiation costs, it is invaluable to organizations that depend on cross-functional teams, interorganizational partnerships, temporary workgroups, and other cooperative structures to coordinate work (e.g., Creed & Miles, 1996; Powell, 1990; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).

In today's flatter organizations, jobs often require cooperation across boundaries, such as functional areas, divisions, and management-versus-union lines. People are continually asked to cross group boundaries to secure cooperation from individuals over whom they have no hierarchical control. However, it is often difficult to develop trust and cooperation across group boundaries, because people frequently perceive individuals from other groups as potential adversaries with conflicting goals, beliefs, or styles of interacting (e.g., Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Kramer, 1991; Kramer & Messick, 1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Even when there is no tension among groups, people in organizations often interact with individuals from other groups as though those individuals were representatives of their respective groups (Kramer, 1991; Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998). And when individuals are viewed as representatives of a social group, interpersonal and intergroup interactions fuse such that the affect and beliefs associated with that social group influence interpersonal interactions with specific group members (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Such fusion is likely to influence trust development, because beliefs about trustworthiness are often associated with social group membership. For instance, people usually hold positive perceptions of fellow group members' trustworthiness and exhibit cooperative behavior toward them (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). In contrast, when people do not belong to a particular group, they often believe members of that group are less trustworthy than members of their own group (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998; Kramer, 1994; Kramer & Messick, 1998).

A similarity-trust, dissimilarity-distrust paradigm, however, does not adequately capture the effects of dissimilar group membership on interpersonal trust, because dissimilar group membership can be associated with either trust or distrust. For instance, some evidence suggests that people from dissimilar groups, such as different functional areas or demographic categories (e.g., race, gender), view members of contrasting groups with distrust, suspicion, and animosity (e.g., Cox, 1993; Donnellon, 1996; Fox, 1974; Kanter, 1977; Kelly & Kelly, 1991; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996), whereas in other research schol-
ars propose that there are instances in which dissimilar group membership actually signals trustworthiness (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996; Zucker, 1986). For instance, Meyerson et al. (1996) describe trust development among professionals working in temporary work systems. They propose that dissimilar professional group membership is associated with rapid trust development in this context, because individuals associate positive beliefs about competence and “good will” with the other professional groups working on the project.

In many contexts institutional bases of trust (e.g., the confidence associated with professional certification, ethics, and training) can generate positive beliefs about a group’s trustworthiness—beliefs that facilitate trust development even when group members and their counterparts are from dissimilar social groups, and evidence-based information about specific group members’ trustworthiness is not yet available (McKnight et al., 1998; Meyerson et al., 1996; Zucker, 1986). More broadly, the expectation that another group (e.g., profession, department, division, or so forth) is likely to help or cooperate with one’s own group generates positive beliefs about group members’ trustworthiness (e.g., Meyerson et al., 1996; Tjosvold, 1988), and the opposite expectation—that another group is likely to compete with one’s group—generates negative beliefs about trustworthiness (e.g., Fiske & Ruscher, 1993).

Beliefs about trustworthiness also may be influenced by the affect associated with a social group. “People often hold strong affective predispositions toward certain social groups” (Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995: 228)—predispositions that influence their feelings for and judgments of individual group members. Despite the fact that people have immediate and often unconscious affective reactions to the group memberships of others (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Fiske, 1982; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986), theorists have focused little attention on understanding the mechanisms through which social group affect influences interpersonal trust development.

In this article I seek to create a fuller, affective-cognitive account of how group membership influences trust development between individuals from dissimilar groups. I use the well-established constructs of competitive and cooperative group interdependence to frame the trust literature and to explain the contrasting positive and negative influences that dissimilar group membership can have on trust development. Further, I develop a model that extends current literature by delineating multiple mechanisms through which affect impacts trust.

This model proposes that affective reactions to another person’s group membership may influence the cognitions, motives, and behaviors associated with trust development. For example, affect can make independent and unconscious contributions to judgments, such as evaluations of trustworthiness (e.g., Bargh, 1984; Schwarz, 1990). Affect also is associated with approach and avoidance motivation (e.g., Fridja, 1986; Lazarus, 1991), which can influence people’s motivation to trust others. In addition, positive affect influences cooperative, prosocial behaviors (George, 1991; George & Brief, 1992; Isen & Baron, 1991)—behaviors that may facilitate trust development.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, I define trust and provide a brief overview of its development. Next, the factors that influence the beliefs and feelings associated with dissimilar social group membership are explored. I then present a model delineating how social group membership and affect influence trust development. Finally, the boundary conditions, implications, and contributions of the model are discussed.

TRUST DEVELOPMENT

Trust Defined

Trust is defined here as one’s willingness to rely on another’s actions in a situation involving the risk of opportunism (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Zand, 1972). For example, when boundary-spanning individuals are willing to reveal sensitive firm information to suppliers, they are willing to risk the harm that would result if this information were shared with their competitors. Trust is based on individuals’ expectations that others will behave in ways that are helpful or at least not harmful (Gambetta, 1988). These expectations, in turn, are based both on people’s perceptions of others’ trustworthiness (e.g., Butler, 1951; Gabarro, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995) and on their affective responses to others (e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Jones
Perspectives on Trust Development

Trust development is portrayed most often as an individual’s experiential process of learning about the trustworthiness of others by interacting with them over time (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Although current models clarify many of the processes that are fundamental to interpersonal trust development, they do not jointly address both the cognitive and the affective influences of social group membership on trust. Both perceived trustworthiness and interpersonal affect, however, have been proposed to influence how trust develops (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).

Perceived trustworthiness. Perceived trustworthiness is a key cognitive predictor of trust (Mayer et al., 1995). Researchers from diverse fields agree that trust develops through repeated social interactions that enable people to update their information about others’ trustworthiness (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Gabarro, 1978; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Zand, 1972).

As many as ten dimensions of perceived trustworthiness have been identified (e.g., Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 1978; Mishra, 1996). Mayer et al. (1995) have consolidated these dimensions into three basic categories, however, arguing that people’s perceptions of others’ ability, benevolence, and integrity explain a major portion of the variance in perceived trustworthiness. These authors define ability as a set of skills or competencies that allow an individual to perform in some area. Benevolence refers to an other-oriented desire to care for the protection of another (Hosmer, 1995), and the perception of integrity involves the belief that another adheres to a set of principles that one finds acceptable (Mayer et al., 1995). Empirical tests suggest that perceptions of ability, benevolence, and integrity constitute important cognitive antecedents of trust (Mayer & Davis, 1999).

Affect. Researchers from sociology, psychology, and organizational theory assert that affect influences trust (e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al., 1985). They propose that affective attachments form the basis for caring and benevolent actions that build trust (McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995), whereas affective responses (e.g., anger, disappointment, joy) influence how people evaluate their feelings for, attachment to, and trust in others (e.g., Jones & George, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).

Theorists who conceptualize trust development as a discrete process involving stages and/or qualitatively different types of trust tend to propose that affect influences higher stages or “deeper” levels of trust (e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al., 1985; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). In general, the deeper types of trust that are associated with affect are more stable over time, across situations, and with respect to small trust violations (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; McAllister, 1995; Morrison & Robinson, 1997). For instance, Rempel et al. (1985) propose that the deepest level of trust, which they call “faith,” requires an emotional investment of “caring responses” and the foundation of a strong relationship or affective attachment. Similarly, McAllister (1995) proposes that trust based on “care and concern” is deeper (or “less superficial”) than trust based primarily on cognitive perceptions of predictable, dependable behavior. Although in discrete models the influence of affect on deeper levels of trust is recognized, the potential influences of affect on more “shallow,” cognitively based types of trust are often ignored. However, to the degree that affect influences judgments, motives, and thought processes, it may actually influence all stages and types of trust.

Theorists who conceptualize trust as a continuous process without distinct types of trust tend to ignore affect as a formal part of their models (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).

1 Throughout this article, the term affect is used to refer to both affective attachments (i.e., an experience of feeling connected and joined; Bowlby, 1969; Kahn, 1988) and affective states (i.e., moods, emotions, and general liking; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). The terms affect and feelings are used interchangeably.
However, Jones and George’s model (1998) is an exception; these authors describe how affect may influence trust-related cognitions: perceptions, beliefs, and judgments. In this article I go beyond the influences of affect on cognition to develop a continuous model of trust development that illustrates how affect influences the cognitions, motives, and behaviors associated with trust. A new affective-cognitive model is presented, which will enable researchers to quantify the similarities and differences among the influences of social group membership, affect, and perceived trustworthiness on overall trust or on specific, discrete types of trust, depending upon how trust is operationalized. Although I do not address how one discrete type of trust is transformed into another discrete type, I do provide insights that are equally relevant for understanding the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral influences of affect on general and discrete types of trust.

Understanding the combined influence of affect, perceived trustworthiness, and social group membership on trust is important for organizations, because affective responses to groups are an integral part of work experiences. People associate affect with groups to which they belong (Brewer, 1979, 1981; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Turner, 1982), with groups that possess valued or despised attributes (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Smith, 1993), and with groups that facilitate or threaten their goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Smith, 1993; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). The affect that people associate with groups, in turn, may influence their feelings for and perceptions of individual group members (e.g., Fiske, 1982; Jussim et al., 1995), thereby influencing both initial levels of trust in individual group members and the trajectory of trust development with those individuals.

Social Group Membership and Categorization

Social categorization and self-categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987) are the primary psychological mechanisms through which group membership influences trust development. Social categorization refers to the process of grouping oneself or others into a social category in contrast to another, such as by gender, race, or profession (Turner, 1987). Social categorization influences trust development through category-driven processing (i.e., stereotyping), a cognitive shortcut that allows people to rely on previously held beliefs rather than incoming information about specific group members (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

After categorizing someone, an individual’s impression formation and judgments may be driven by this initial categorization process (i.e., category driven) or may be influenced by individuating information (e.g., personal appearance, past behavior, other category memberships). Category-driven processing is a default processing strategy that is highly likely to occur when an individual is under time pressure, cognitively busy with other tasks, or not particularly motivated to make accurate impressions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For instance, “when an individual is distracted or attending to cues in the situation other than group membership, behaviors reflecting aversion or fear of out-group members are more likely to appear” (Brewer & Brown, 1998: 575).

Category-driven processing requires a high degree of perceived “fit” or overlap between an individual’s attributes and the characteristics associated with a category (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). When people expend the time and energy necessary to notice that others do not fit a category well, they usually attempt to recategorize the person into a subcategory (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). A subcategory is influenced by the information in the initial category selected but also includes exceptional features that replace or append some of the original information (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). For example, subcategorization has occurred when a person who was initially categorized as Latino is recategorized into the subcategory Latino-engineer—a subcategory likely to have information about mathematical expertise not found in the original category.

Subcategorizing people according to their multiple category memberships allows many of the beliefs and feelings associated with the original category to influence the beliefs and feelings associated with the individual. However, the subcategorization process falls between the extremes of category-driven processing (using only one category) and piecemeal integration (using only individuating information). Subcategorization may occur frequently in organizations because employees belong both to multiple demographic categories (e.g., gen-
der, race, and age) and to one or more organizationally relevant categories (e.g., department, function, and/or business unit).

In this article I offer three reasons for investigating the influence of category-driven processing on interpersonal trust. First, people in organizations often perceive and interact with individuals from other groups as though they were representatives of their respective groups (Kramer, 1991; Labianca et al., 1998). Second, as people move away from pure category-driven processing toward subcategorization, their processing is still influenced by the initial categorization process. Third, once the affect associated with a social group is triggered by the initial categorization process, it may immediately influence people’s general affective state and have nonconscious effects on judgments (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Olson & Zanna, 1993). Although I examine the influence of dissimilar social category membership on trust development using the strongest case scenario, in which category-driven processing occurs, I recognize that contextual factors may influence the extent to which category-driven processing happens. This discussion of contextual factors appears in the section on boundary conditions.

**SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND PREDICTORS OF TRUST**

People tend to associate positive beliefs and feelings with the groups to which they belong (e.g., Brewer, 1979). The beliefs and feelings they associate with other groups, however, may be positive, negative, or neutral (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998). Two factors influence the trust-related beliefs and affect that specific individuals associate with other social groups or categories: (1) people’s own group memberships (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Turner, 1987) and (2) the interdependence that exists between groups (e.g., Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Stephan et al., 1998; Tjosvold, 1988). As illustrated in Figure 1, interdependence is proposed as a critical influence on the beliefs and feelings associated with other groups.

**Perceived Trustworthiness and Social Group Membership**

Both similar and dissimilar group membership influence perceived trustworthiness. The positive influence of similar group membership creates a backdrop for the more varied influence of dissimilar group membership.

**Similar group membership and perceived trustworthiness.** An ingroup is a group to which one belongs, whereas an outgroup is a relevant comparison group that is viewed in contrast to one’s ingroup. Individuals strive to maintain a positive ingroup image by making social comparisons with other social groups that favor their own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). By maintaining a positive image of their ingroup, individuals contribute to their own self-esteem (Turner, 1987).

The literature on social identity suggests that the positive beliefs typically associated with similar group membership influence trust and cooperation (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer, 1991; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). For example, cooperation increases when a common identity is made salient in social dilemma experiments (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Moreover, categorizing individuals into a similar category on an arbi-

**FIGURE 1**

Outgroup Interdependence and Category-Based Associations

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tary basis has consistently led group members to prefer individuals within their own group and to see these individuals as more trustworthy, honest, and cooperative than members of other groups (Brewer, 1979). Although ingroup favoritism arises even when groups are based on arbitrary distinctions, the strength of one's identification with a social group and the importance placed on that identity will affect the extent to which group membership influences behavior (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994).

Identification refers to "the perception of one-ness with or belongingness to some human aggregate" (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 22). Identification makes group goals and values more salient than personal goals and increases the perceived similarity between one's goals and values and those of other group members (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). When ingroup members perceive similarities in goals and values, they believe that other ingroup members are more likely to behave in accordance with these values (i.e., beliefs about ingroup members' integrity) and that ingroup members are more likely to care about goals that are good for all group members (i.e., beliefs about ingroup members' benevolence).

The positive ingroup beliefs associated with similar group membership and identification can create a "deficit" with respect to positive perceptions of outgroup members' benevolence and integrity. However, identification alone does not generate negative beliefs about outgroup members (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998); competitive interdependence also must exist. Two groups are interdependent when the actions of one group influence the outcomes of the other (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993), but the nature of that interdependence may be competitive or cooperative; it may inhibit or facilitate goal attainment and generate negative or positive beliefs about the other group.

Dissimilar group membership and perceived trustworthiness: Competitive outgroup interdependence. Competitive interdependence refers to the perception that an outgroup represents a threat to the goals of one's ingroup or to one's personal goals (e.g., Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Tjosvold, 1988). Outgroups are perceived as a threat when either real or symbolic conflicts of interest exist between groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 1998). Real conflicts of interest occur when groups compete for scarce resources or strive for mutually exclusive goals (e.g., Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif & Sherif, 1956). Symbolic conflicts of interest exist when people believe that outgroups "violate cherished values and norms" of their ingroup (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

Competitive outgroup interdependence may lead to negative category-based perceptions of outgroup members' trustworthiness (i.e., integrity and benevolence). Real competition with an outgroup undermines perceptions of benevolence, because people with conflicting goals are not expected to act in ways that are benevolent or helpful (Tjosvold, 1988). Symbolic competition (i.e., incongruent core values) undermines perceived integrity, because outgroup members do not adhere to principles that ingroup members find acceptable. Incongruent core values not only undermine perceived integrity but also can generate distrust, because distrust entails "the belief that a person's values or motives will lead them to approach all situations in an unacceptable way" (Sitkin & Roth, 1993: 373).

Competitive interdependence has been documented among groups in organizations (e.g., Cox, 1993; Donnellon, 1996; Eccles & White, 1988; Fox, 1974; Kelly & Kelly, 1991; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). For instance, line workers' expectations for autonomy may conflict with management's objectives for control over work processes (Fox, 1974). Divisions or functional areas may struggle to obtain scarce resources (Eccles & White, 1988), to retain status (Donnellon, 1996), and/or to preserve the cherished norms and values of a professional group (Sitkin & Stickel, 1996). Although dissimilar group membership is often researched in the context of intergroup competition, groups can also have relationships that are cooperatively interdependent or independent.

Dissimilar group membership and perceived trustworthiness: Cooperative outgroup interdependence. Cooperative interdependence exists when people believe that they gain when others succeed (e.g., Tjosvold, 1986, 1988). Real cooperation exists when groups come together, interact, and form psychological relationships for mutual gain (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995: 10). For example, consultants from different areas of a company may need to work together to write a "winning" proposal (Tjosvold, 1988). Symbolic cooperation, in contrast, refers to a strong similarity of core values, norms, attitudes, or aspirations in the absence of any real conflict. It stems
from the belief that a social group “upholds cherished values and norms” of one’s ingroup (i.e., congruent core values; Esses et al., 1993).

Cooperative outgroup interdependence may lead to positive perceptions of group members’ trustworthiness (e.g., Tjosvold, 1986). Symbolic cooperation (i.e., congruent core values) may lead people to believe that outgroup members are more likely to behave in accordance with shared values (i.e., perceived integrity), whereas real cooperation (i.e., goal/resource facilitation) may be associated with the belief that shared goals will lead members of other groups to act in ways that are in the best interest of the ingroup (i.e., perceived benevolence).

Tjosvold (1988) found that when employees from different groups believed that the goals of their respective groups were cooperative, they expected people from other groups to act in helpful, collaborative, trustworthy ways. Similarly, Meyerson et al. (1996) describe how people from dissimilar professions were able to quickly develop the trust needed to complete complex tasks because they believed that everyone involved in the temporary work system held shared goals and that everyone involved would personally benefit from the project’s success.

**Dissimilar group membership and perceived trustworthiness: Outgroup independence.** When people view their relationship to an outgroup as independent, they believe two conditions exist: (1) outgroup members have relatively little ability to influence whether or not ingroup members achieve their goals, and (2) outgroup members hold values that neither strongly support nor violate their ingroup’s core values and norms (Tjosvold, 1988). When people are not dependent on another group in terms of real or symbolic interdependence, strong negative or positive beliefs about group members’ benevolence or integrity are less likely. Thus, an independent outgroup category should lack the positive beliefs about benevolence and integrity often associated with ingroup categories and the negative beliefs often associated with competitive outgroups.

Because I do not propose that outgroup independence influences the beliefs people associate with an outgroup category, I do not address it in the propositions. The proposed influences of competitive and cooperative outgroup interdependence on category-based beliefs are as follows.

**Proposition 1a:** As the perception of real competition (i.e., goal/resource conflict) between two groups increases, ingroup members’ beliefs about outgroup members’ benevolence (i.e., category-based beliefs about benevolence) will decrease.

**Proposition 1b:** As the perception of symbolic competition (i.e., core value/norm incongruence) between two groups increases, ingroup members’ beliefs about outgroup members’ integrity (i.e., category-based beliefs about integrity) will decrease.

**Proposition 2a:** As the perception of real cooperation (i.e., goal/resource facilitation) between two groups increases, ingroup members’ beliefs about outgroup members’ benevolence (i.e., category-based beliefs about benevolence) will increase.

**Proposition 2b:** As the perception of symbolic cooperation (i.e., core value/norm congruence) between two groups increases, ingroup members’ beliefs about outgroup members’ integrity (i.e., category-based beliefs about integrity) will increase.

**Affect and Social Group Membership**

Both similar and dissimilar group membership influence affect. The positive influence of similar group membership creates a backdrop for the more varied influence of dissimilar group membership.

**Similar group membership and affect.** In addition to generating positive beliefs about trustworthiness, similar group membership is associated with generating positive feelings that can create a “deficit” with respect to positive feelings for outgroup members (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Brown, 1998). For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (1993) found that even without a specific referent category, the ingroup pronoun “we” automatically activated positive category-based affect (i.e., the affect associated with a social group category).

Group identification further enhances the positive affect generated by ingroup membership, because it fosters additional positive feelings—
the positive feelings associated with affective attachments. An affective attachment to a group is similar to an affective attachment to an individual, in that it refers to an experience of feeling “joined, seen and felt, known, and not alone” (Kahn, 1998: 39). Ingroup members often have feelings of attachment associated with belonging to a particular group (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Brewer & Brown, 1998). Brewer reported that, for ethnic groups, “Affective attachment to an ingroup, as distinct from specifiable out-groups, was found universally” (1981: 349). Consistent with this finding, Tajfel noted that identification was often associated with “some emotional and value significance” (cited in Turner, 1982: 18). Attachment to an ingroup may create a critical gap in the positive affect felt toward outgroups, because people rarely hold strong affective attachments for outgroups.

Dissimilar group membership and affect: Competitive outgroup interdependence. Emotions are affective states that stem from the appraisals people make about how others have influenced or are likely to influence their goals and well-being (Ellsworth, 1991; Smith, 1993). Outgroup interdependence generates emotion, because interdependence enables one group to interrupt another group’s ability to achieve its goals (Fiske, 1998), and goal disruption, whether helpful or hindering, generates emotion (Mandler, 1975).

Real competition for scarce resources, power, or mutually exclusive goals can generate negative affect or more intense emotions, such as anger, contempt, and fear (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Smith, 1993). Even minor conflicts over the best means of achieving a shared goal can lead to negative affect, based on the perception that members of other groups have different “ways of doing things” that might slow progress toward a joint goal (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993).

Symbolic conflict—that is, the perception that an outgroup violates core ingroup values—can also generate negative affect (Esses et al., 1993), as well as stronger feelings of disgust or contempt (Smith, 1993). Stephan et al. (1998) found that perceptions of symbolic, value-based conflicts and real, resource-based conflicts were significantly correlated with negative affective responses toward immigrant groups. Similarly, Sitkin and Stickel (1996) reported that negative and hurt feelings were associated with core value incongruence and threats to the professional autonomy of scientists in a research lab. In another study the threats to core values and resources posed by a stigmatized group (i.e., coworkers with HIV/AIDS) engendered fear (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).

Further, people often associate additional anxiety with the thought of interacting with members of competitive outgroups. People can feel anxious because of the hostility they feel for the group or because they fear negative outcomes, such as having their values challenged or being embarrassed (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). In the case of certain demographic outgroup categories (e.g., race, gender, and ethnicity), people may fear “slipping” and acting in a way that will be perceived as biased or prejudiced (Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

Dissimilar group membership and affect: Cooperative outgroup interdependence. Cooperative outgroup interdependence may often generate positive affect. Concrete outcomes from real cooperative actions with an outgroup can generate positive affect or provoke strong positive emotions, such as hope or happiness, because they facilitate goal achievement (Fiske, 1998). Symbolic cooperation (i.e., congruent core values/norms) may generate general positive affect or admiration when a similarity of core values, norms, or aspirations exists in the absence of real competition. For example, in a consulting firm and a public utility, Tjosvold (1988) found a positive correlation between perceptions of cooperative interdependence with another group and positive feelings about future interactions with members of that group.

Dissimilar group membership and affect: Outgroup independence. When people view their relationship to an outgroup as independent in terms of both goals and values, the affect associated with that group may be neutral or may reflect the general positive or negative feelings associated with the affective tone of the category’s general stereotype (e.g., kind-positive, deceitful-negative; Fiske, 1982). However, because independent outgroups do not have the potential to interrupt ingroup goals, they are much less likely to be associated with strong affect than ingroups or interdependent outgroups. Tjosvold (1988) found no correlation between perceptions of independence from another group and positive feelings about future interactions with members of that group.
Because I do not propose that outgroup independence significantly influences the feelings people associate with an outgroup category, I do not address it in the propositions. The proposed influences of competitive and cooperative outgroup interdependence are as follows.

Proposition 3: As the perception of either real competition (i.e., goal/resource conflict) or symbolic competition (i.e., core value/norm incongruence) with an outgroup increases, the negative affect that ingroup members associate with the outgroup category (i.e., negative category-based affect) will increase.

Proposition 4: As the perception of either real cooperation (i.e., goal/resource facilitation) or symbolic cooperation (i.e., core value/norm congruence) with an outgroup increases, the positive affect that ingroup members associate with the outgroup category (i.e., positive category-based affect) will increase.

AFFECTIVE-COGNITIVE MODEL OF DISSIMILAR GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND TRUST

The affective-cognitive model developed here delineates how the affect associated with dissimilar social groups influences people’s perceptions of individual group members’ trustworthiness, their motivation to trust group members, and their prosocial behavior toward group members. This model is built on the premise that people often make judgments based on their beliefs about other people’s social group membership (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and on the foundation of cognitive processes traditionally associated with trust development (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995). Figure 2 summarizes the affective-cognitive social group model of trust development presented here.

Linking Group Membership to Interpersonal Trust: Category-Driven Processing

Category-driven processing occurs when people rely on previously held beliefs about a social group rather than incoming information about specific group members (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). In experimental studies researchers have found that category-based beliefs influence the beliefs people associate with specific group members (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Likewise, category-based affect has been found to influence the feelings people have for individual group members (e.g., Fiske, 1982; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). For example, Fiske (1982) found that when
Affect and Trust Development: Three Mechanisms

Although the links between perceived trustworthiness and trust are well established, the role of affect in trust development has not been clearly defined. In research on the relationship between affect and trust, scholars have primarily investigated the construct of emotion- or affect-based trust (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; McAllister, 1995; Rempel et al., 1985). For example, McAllister (1995) found that managers' affect-based trust for a peer was positively related to their citizenship behavior toward that peer and their monitoring of that peer's needs. However, the construct of affect-based trust cannot reveal the mechanisms through which affect influences trust, because the construct of affect-based trust combines the concept of trust (i.e., one's willingness to rely on another) with that of "care and concern"—an affective predictor of trust.

In this article I separate trust from its affective antecedents, proposing that affective states and affective attachments influence how people evaluate others' trustworthiness, how motivated they are to display trust in others, and how inclined they are to cooperate with or help others.

Affect and perceived trustworthiness. People frequently use their feelings as information when making judgments about others. Researchers have consistently found that people who are in a positive rather than negative mood evaluate other individuals and their own past life events more favorably (e.g., Forgas, 1992; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). The feelings-as-information model suggests that people use their apparent affective reactions as a basis of judgment (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Moods influence evaluative judgments, unless individuals attribute their feelings to an irrelevant source, such as a cloudy versus sunny day (e.g., Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Even when people are erroneously led to believe that their feelings stem from an irrelevant source, this belief leads them to make evaluative judgments that are not influenced by their feelings (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). People's ability to discount their feelings when they believe the source is irrelevant supports the premise that feelings act as information.
Because moods are unfocused affective states that capture the general positive or negative feelings people experience (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), nonconscious affective responses to another person’s social group membership may enhance or detract from other influences on mood. An individual’s overall mood, then, may serve as information in evaluating trustworthiness. Negative category-based affect may be particularly likely to have a nonconscious influence on people’s moods, because people are more likely to try to suppress their negative feelings toward an outgroup than their positive feelings (Brewer & Brown, 1998). When people are trying to control their negative category-based affect, negative affect may “seep out” in their nonverbal behavior and also have a nonconscious effect on their mood and subsequent perceptions of others’ trustworthiness. For example, Jones & George contend that “if, when meeting a stranger, a person experiences high negative affect . . . , he or she may initially distrust that person” (1998: 534).

Category-based affect may also influence perceived trustworthiness through its influence on feelings for specific outgroup members. Although the affect felt for an outgroup member is not likely to influence the wide variety of miscellaneous judgments that would be influenced by more general moods, it is likely to influence a circumscribed set of judgments that are related to that specific individual, such as judgments of trustworthiness (Clor, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). Thus, feelings for a specific individual represent a relevant source of information for evaluating another’s trustworthiness. Strong feelings may be particularly influential during trust development because, as the intensity of feelings increase, “other (non-affective) sources of information may be increasingly ignored” (Clor et al., 1994: 387).

Hypothesis 5a: As the positive category-based affect associated with an outgroup category increases, perceptions of trustworthiness will increase. Conversely, as the negative affect that is felt for specific outgroup members increases, perceptions of trustworthiness will decrease.

Hypothesis 5b: As the positive affect that is felt for specific outgroup members increases, perceptions of trustworthiness will increase. Conversely, as the negative affect that is felt for specific outgroup members increases, perceptions of trustworthiness will decrease.

Affect and motivation to trust. The motivation to trust is defined here as the desire to view another person as trustworthy enough to be relied on. People who want to maintain their relationships with specific others may be motivated to view them as “trustworthy enough,” because demonstrating trust in others is one way that people attempt to build and maintain social relationships (e.g., Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1988). People striving to maintain a relationship, for instance, should avoid showing suspicion or displaying a reluctance to offer trust, because these behaviors often destroy personal relationships (Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1993).

In general, affective states (e.g., liking, contempt) influence the motivation to trust because they are associated with the motivation to approach or avoid others (e.g., Fridja, 1988; Lazarus, 1991). Directed affective states, such as liking or admiration for a particular outgroup member, influence people’s motivation to trust by enhancing their desire to approach and form connections with that group member. Conversely, negative affect and specific negative emotions, such as anxiety, disgust, and contempt, decrease the motivation to trust because these feelings prompt people to avoid interacting with others.

Affective attachments are particularly likely to increase people’s motivation to trust because they not only motivate behaviors that maintain relationships but also invoke people’s need to belong, which is “a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995: 497). Although affective attachments to outgroup members may develop over time and enhance people’s motivation to trust particular outgroup members, affective attachments to an outgroup are much less likely than affective attachments to an ingroup. Therefore, it is more often the lack of attachment to outgroups and resulting lack of motivation to trust that influence how trust develops in new relationships with outgroup members.

Hypothesis 6: As the positive affect that is felt for specific outgroup members increases, motivation to trust will
increase. Conversely, as the negative affect that is felt for specific outgroup members increases, motivation to trust will decrease.

The motivation to trust influences trust through "motivated reasoning"—a process that entails a less critical cognitive analysis of preference-consistent information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Using liking as a motivator, Ditto and Lopez (1992) found that subjects required more information to decide that a dislikable student was more intelligent than less intelligent. Similarly, when people are not motivated to trust an outgroup member, more evidence of trustworthiness may be required for trust to develop. The motivation to trust influences whether or not a certain level of perceived trustworthiness is high enough for one individual to trust another in a given situation. The more motivated people are to trust, the lower their threshold is for offering trust. Because less information is required to generate trust as the motivation to trust increases, every incremental increase in perceived trustworthiness should generate a greater increase in trust as the motivation to trust increases.

Hypothesis 7a: As the motivation to trust increases, trust will increase, after controlling for increases in perceived trustworthiness.

Hypothesis 7b: As the motivation to trust increases, increases in perceived trustworthiness will generate greater increases in trust.

Motivation to trust will also influence how people evaluate others' behavior and how they update their perceptions of others' trustworthiness. For instance, people who are motivated to trust will require less information to perceive ambiguous behavior as trustworthy. This influence of the motivation to trust is discussed further in the section on feedback processes.

Affect and cooperative behavior. In organizational settings positive affect has been associated with helping behavior, generosity, and cooperation (George, 1991; George & Brief, 1992; Isen & Baron, 1991). George (1991) found that positive affect was a significant predictor of helpful behavior directed toward customers. Further, Isen notes that "a large body of research indicates that positive affect can influence social behavior—in particular, sociability, cooperativeness in negotiation, and kindness" (1987: 206). The positive mood generated by simple surprises, such as finding a coin or unexpectedly receiving cookies, has been found to influence people's willingness to help others (Isen, 1987).

Although positive affect has primarily been shown to influence low-cost helping behaviors, such as picking up scattered papers, many cooperative behaviors, such as sharing sensitive information with others, are "low cost" in terms of time and energy but risky in terms of possible opportunism. When trust is present, positive affect may facilitate cooperative behaviors like information sharing, which require little investment of time and cognitive resources but have the drawback of making individuals vulnerable to opportunism.

Both positive category-based affect and the positive affect felt for specific individuals may contribute to a positive mood that fosters cooperative behavior. However, the positive affect felt for specific individuals (e.g., liking, affective attachments) may further influence cooperation by altering the time and energy people are willing to dedicate to mutually beneficial versus individually rewarded tasks. Because positive affect for specific individuals increases the desire to maintain relationships (Fredrickson, 1998), it may increase the value or social rewards people associate with cooperation, which, in turn, may increase their general propensity to engage in cooperative versus individually rewarded tasks.

Hypothesis 8a: As positive category-based affect for an outgroup increases, the cooperative behavior directed toward individual outgroup members will increase, after controlling for increases in trust.

Hypothesis 8b: As positive affect for an individual outgroup member (e.g., liking, affective attachments) increases, the cooperative behavior directed toward that person will increase, after controlling for increases in trust.

Positive affect may have an indirect effect on subsequent trust development through the cooperative behaviors it promotes. For instance, cooperative behaviors that are perceived as be-
nevolent actions or demonstrations of concern will have a positive influence on perceived trustworthiness (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Mishra, 1996; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Further, helping behaviors such as task assistance and emotional counseling may inadvertently allow people to demonstrate their interpersonal skills and work-related expertise, thus providing multiple opportunities for people to interact and update their perceptions of each other's ability and benevolence in nonthreatening situations. Negative category-based affect or even neutral affect may limit such cooperative opportunities for building trust.

**Feedback Processes**

**Attributions.** In research on trust violations, revenge, and psychological contract violations, scholars stress the importance of attributions for how individuals update their thoughts and feelings about others' trustworthiness after negative outcomes (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1996; Kramer, 1994; Kramer & Messick, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Sitkin and Roth (1993) argue that trust violations that are perceived as an isolated event will not influence perceptions of trustworthiness, whereas trust violations that are perceived as typical of a person will. For example, if untrustworthy behavior is consistently attributed to external factors, perceptions of others' trustworthiness will not decrease, even though trusted others are behaving in ways that lead to negative outcomes.

Attributions also influence people's affective responses to trust-related interactions (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Because different emotions are associated with different patterns of cognitive appraisals (Ellsworth, 1991), the attributions people make about the causes of their own outcomes after trusting someone may influence their affective response to that person's behavior. For instance, the attribution that someone was responsible for untrustworthy behavior may generate anger or disappointment, whereas attributions that external factors were responsible for the negative outcome may cause sadness (Ellsworth, 1991).

**Attributions and social group membership.** Social group membership influences the types of attributions people make for others' behavior (e.g., Kramer, 1994; Kramer et al., 1996; see Weber, 1994, for a review). For example, individuals tend to make more “forgiving” attributions for the dispositions, motives, and intentions of members of their own group relative to members of other groups (Weber, 1994). Even when groups are based on arbitrary distinctions, people are more likely to make forgiving attributions for the negative behavior of ingroup members—attributing ingroup members’ negative behavior to external causes or temporary factors (Kramer et al., 1996; Weber, 1994). Conversely, people are more likely to make unforgiving attributions for the negative behavior of outgroup members—attributing outgroup members' negative behavior to internal, stable dispositional factors (Kramer et al., 1996; Weber, 1994).

I propose that the category-based beliefs and affect associated with social group membership influence attributions about trustworthy behavior indirectly. Category-based beliefs and affect influence both people’s perceptions of specific outgroup members' trustworthiness and their affect for specific outgroup members, which, in turn, influence attributions by generating cognitive biases. For instance, to the degree that category-based beliefs generate strong beliefs about an individual outgroup member’s trustworthiness, subsequent attributions about that person’s behavior may be biased by those original category-based beliefs. Higgins and Bargh have noted that “once a social judgment is made it has pervasive effects on the processing of relevant information, which mainly serve to perpetuate the (original) belief” (1987: 384). For example, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors may receive less attention and be more poorly remembered (e.g., Hamilton, 1979; Markus, 1977).

Category-based affect also influences attributions indirectly, through its influence on affect and the motivation to trust. The motivation to trust influences attributions, because it triggers the process of “motivated reasoning” that leads people to accept less information when making preference-consistent attributions. Thus, as motivation to trust increases, less information should be required to make forgiving attributions (i.e., attribute untrustworthy behavior to external or unstable causes and trustworthy behavior to internal, stable causes). Similarly, less information should be required to attribute trustworthy intentions to ambiguous behavior.
Hypothesis 9: As the perception of specific outgroup members' trustworthiness increases, "forgiving" attributions will increase (i.e., internal attributions for positive outcomes from trust-related behavior and external attributions for negative outcomes from trust-related behavior).

Hypothesis 10: As the motivation to trust specific outgroup members increases, "forgiving" attributions will increase (i.e., internal attributions for positive outcomes from trust-related behavior and external attributions for negative outcomes from trust-related behavior).

Boundary Conditions: Influences of Context on Category-Driven Processing

The model developed here is based on the premise that social group membership influences trust development to the degree that category-driven processing occurs (i.e., people apply previously held beliefs about a group to specific group members, rather than use individuating information about them). Although category-driven processing may influence many interpersonal interactions in organizations, contextual factors influence the extent to which category-driven processing will influence these interactions.

Multiple components of context influence category-driven processing in organizational settings. For example, tasks that are ambiguous and nonroutine and tasks that involve time pressure or perceived crises increase category-driven processes, because they consume the time, attention, and cognitive capacity necessary for processing individuating information (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). At an organizational level, a firm’s culture can influence employees’ motivation to use individuating information (Cox, 1993). Research indicates that people are able to inhibit the use of category-based beliefs when they make a conscious commitment to avoid using them and are aware that their category-based beliefs might affect their judgment (Olson & Zanna, 1993). Larkey (1996) suggests that firms with cultures that value diversity may decrease category-driven processing, because such cultures increase employees’ attention to the individual characteristics of others and motivate employees to make more accurate interpersonal judgments.2

The reward systems in organizations influence category-driven processing by influencing the salience and goal relevance of particular outgroups (Tjosvold, 1988). For instance, when reward systems generate high levels of intergroup competition, they create situations that motivate people to perceive each other in terms of their group membership (Turner, 1987)—a perception that increases the likelihood category-driven processing will occur.

Finally, in most contexts people initially use demographic categories to categorize others (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). However, the demographic composition of an organization may increase or decrease the salience of demographic categories and thereby the likelihood that category-driven processing will occur. For example, demographic categories are particularly salient in organizations with few members from certain demographic groups (i.e., token status; Kanter, 1977). They are also salient when particular demographic categories consistently overlap with other organizational categories, such as job level (e.g., female clerical staff in a firm of predominantly male lawyers; Cox, 1993).

CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The affective influences of social group membership on trust development have received little attention. In this article I highlight how perceptions of outgroup interdependence can lead to intense category-based affect, which, in turn, may influence people’s perceptions of specific category members’ trustworthiness, their motivation to trust, and their prosocial behavior toward category members.

This article contributes to our understanding of trust development because extant models rarely address social group membership (e.g., Gabarro, 1978; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992; cf. McKnight et al., 1998). In discrete stage models, for instance, it is often implied that initial stages of trust development reflect a level playing field. Individuals

2 The term diversity is used here in its broadest sense to refer to differences in race, gender, national origin, ethnicity, and ability, as well as differences in attitudes and perspectives (e.g., Larkey, 1996).
in new dyads are all assumed to start off with relatively low levels of trust, regardless of their similar or dissimilar group memberships (e.g., Gabarro, 1978; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). In these models it is also assumed that individuals in new dyads have little individualized information about one another. However, if category-driven processing occurs, this lack of individuating information does not prevent assessments of high or low trustworthiness, because the beliefs and affect that people associate with a social group are assumed to apply to the dyad partner. These initial category-based perceptions and affective responses, in turn, may bias the attributional process that people use to update their trust in that dyad partner such that their original beliefs are reinforced, and trust development is accelerated or inhibited.

Another contribution of this article is the synthesis of the literature on dissimilar social group membership and trust. I clarify why a similarity-trust, dissimilarity-distrust paradigm is inadequate for understanding how trust develops between members of dissimilar groups. Drawing from literature on institutional bases of trust (e.g., Zucker, 1986) and on intergroup behavior (Brewer, 1981; Sherif & Sherif, 1956), I note that dissimilar group membership may have positive, negative, or neutral influences on trust development. I propose that cooperative and competitive outgroup interdependence are more critical than ingroup identification for understanding the range of influences that dissimilar group membership can have on trust development, because outgroup interdependence may generate either positive or negative beliefs (and feelings) about an outgroup.

The model also contributes to our understanding of the role of affect in interpersonal trust development by explicating paths through which affect influences cognitive, motivational, and behavioral predictors of trust. Although several researchers have noted the importance of affect for trust development (e.g., Lewis & Weigert, 1985; McAllister, 1995), the mechanisms through which affect influences trust have not been clearly articulated. The multiple paths proposed in the affective-cognitive model suggest that affect directly or indirectly influences all phases of trust development, from initial perceptions of trustworthiness to the attributional processes that influence the trajectory of trust development over time.

Finally, this article illustrates that both the presence and the absence of category-based affect may influence how trust develops. Negative category-based affect, for instance, may have a nonconscious influence on people’s moods, behaviors, and trust-related judgment, because people often try to control and suppress their negative feelings toward an outgroup. Moreover, even when negative category-based affect is not present, the "lack of positive affect" associated with many dissimilar social groups may influence trust by reducing the number of spontaneous cooperative behaviors people engage in with outgroup members and by eliminating feelings as a positive source of information about others’ trustworthiness.

**Model Limitations**

In this article I present a dyadic model of how one person develops trust in another. Although I demonstrate the potential impact of social group membership on trust development, I do not explore the dynamic processes that occur when two people simultaneously perceive each other’s group membership and experience themselves as the target of the other person’s impression formation. For example, an interaction with someone who seems to perceive you as a member of an admired or stigmatized group may influence your affective response to and trust in that person.

Further, I explore organizationally relevant, contextual factors that influence people’s use of category-driven processing during trust development, rather than individual-level influences. I leave the examination of individual influences for future research. For instance, I do not investigate how individual differences in category-based affect or ingroup identification may influence category-driven processes. However, the strong category-based affect that some people associate with outgroup categories may increase the likelihood that they will use category-driven processing. People’s strong affective responses may increase their motivation to attribute the valence-consistent positive or negative characteristics they associate with a group to individual outgroup members.

Another example of an individual-level process is ingroup identification—a process that
increases the perceived overlap between one's personal goals and the goals of one's ingroup (e.g., Brewer, 1979; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Identification may increase the personal relevance of the interdependence between one's ingroup and relevant outgroups. When people identify strongly versus weakly with an ingroup, their perception that another group is cooperatively or competitively interdependent with their ingroup may more strongly influence their category-based beliefs and feelings about the harm or benefits the outgroup is likely to produce. Although an in-depth discussion of individual-level influences on category-based processes is beyond the scope of this article, investigating individual-level influences represents an important direction for extending the current model.

**Directions for Future Research**

The hypotheses in the affective-cognitive model need to be tested using a variety of organizationally relevant groups, such as functional areas, demographic categories, and multiple-group-membership subcategories (e.g., Latino engineers, women lawyers). Experimental studies will be important for accurately measuring people's nonconscious affective responses to social groups. Further, because much of the evidence for the dissimilarity-distrust relationship among demographically dissimilar individuals is based on anecdotal evidence, research on diversity would benefit from empirical investigations of trust development that consider how intergroup relations, individual perceptions, and contextual factors help predict when trust development is most likely to be influenced by demographic dissimilarity. Finally, longitudinal studies that measure the indirect impact of category membership on the speed and stability of trust development over time will represent an important test of the model. Longitudinal studies should also investigate the development of both global and specific types of trust over time, providing insight into how category membership influences the development of qualitatively different types of trust.

**Implications for Practice**

Category-based processes that slow or inhibit trust development may create a critical gap in cooperation or coordination, especially for firms that are in rapidly changing environments. Organizations have several means for decreasing the negative category-based processes that inhibit trust. Managers may choose reward systems and structure tasks in ways that promote identification with an inclusive ingroup, such as the project or organization. They may attempt to change people's personal beliefs and promote more favorable attitudes by providing opportunities for intergroup cooperation between groups of equal status (Olson & Zanna, 1993). Or they may try to motivate people to pay more attention to other individuals' unique attributes by instituting programs that increase tolerance for constructive conflict around work-related issues and programs that develop people's capacity for valuing different perspectives and approaches to work (Thomas & Ely, 1996).

The strategies mentioned above summarize traditional approaches to intergroup relations. The model developed here further indicates that managers need to attend to the affective context of work interactions. For example, because negative moods that are attributed to irrelevant causes do not influence evaluations of others (Clor, 1994), managers, who articulate plausible sources of negative feelings, such as project-related stress, may be able to decrease the impact of negative, nonconscious, category-based affect. When managers articulate their impression that a particular cross-functional project is challenging or stressful, people may attribute their negative affect to the difficulty of the project rather than the behavior or personality of specific outgroup members. This type of attribution process could decrease the influence of negative category-based affect on evaluations of others' trustworthiness in cross-functional, interdepartmental, and interorganizational situations. Thus, the articulation of negative feelings and the accounts given for the causes of those feelings may represent an effective but underused managerial tool.

**CONCLUSION**

This article highlights multiple ways that dissimilar social group membership can influence trust development. I have proposed that the competitive or cooperative interdependence that exists between two groups impacts people's beliefs about group members' trustworthiness and the affect associated with them. Affect, in
turn, influences interpersonal trust development through multiple paths: cognitive, motivational, and behavioral. The model developed here illustrates how affect influences people’s perceptions of individual group members’ trustworthiness, their motivation to trust group members, and their prosocial behavior toward them. Through this article, I seek to motivate empirical tests and a more precise understanding of the social and affective factors that influence how trust develops.

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